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Abstract  
 
Almost everyone agrees on two general features displayed by the recent banking 
crisis, namely: the crisis was stupefyingly complex and the financial system was 
devoured by its own creations. Beyond these points of agreement, there are many 
questions that will be debated by academics and policymakers for decades. One of the 
outstanding questions is what caused the financial crisis 2007-08. To shed light on 
this question, the paper compiles a list of the tentative causes of the recent financial 
crisis, discusses their separability and attempts an appraisal of the separable causes 
using the Hicksian methodology for causality analysis. Specifically, this paper 
identifies three major separable causes of the recent banking crisis and brings into 
sharp focus the far-from-trivial requirements that are necessary in order to 
demonstrate that a particular set of events can indeed be the preponderant causes of 
the severe banking crisis 2007-08. 
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1 
1. Introduction 
 
In the wake of the recent financial meltdown, the subject of financial crises has come 
to the forefront of academic and policy analysis. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), 
(2008b) have documented, financial crisis are often linked to economic growth, 
capital inflows and financial innovation. The general category of financial crises 
includes a variety of phenomena such as banking crisis, inflation outbursts, currency 
crushes, external defaults, and domestic defaults. Although the crisis 2007-2008 is 
usually referred to as the ‘financial crisis 2007-08,’ it is clear that the expression 
‘banking crisis 2007-08’ is a better term.1 
 
All banking crises have an onset, an outbreak and a culmination. They can be either 
severe or mild. A severe banking crisis occurs when the lending process suddenly 
stops. For example, the financial meltdown 2007-08 started in July 2007 with the 
bailout of Bear Stearns, exploded out of control on 15 September 2008 with the fall of 
Lehman Brothers, and culminated as a severe banking crisis in October 2008. Severe 
financial crises occur when gradually rising complexity brings about pervasive 
Knightian uncertainty.2 
 
The financial turmoil 1997-98 –originated by the collapse of the Malaysian ringgit in 
1997 and the Russian devaluation of the rubble and declaration of a moratorium on 17 
August 1998– illustrates a mild financial crisis. The financial instability ended with 
the near-bankruptcy of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) and 
its rescue by a creditor consortium organized by the Federal Reserve in September 
1998. The LTCM episode put fear in the heart of the financial community but it was 
not a severe banking crisis. In fact, the rescue package avoided the seizing up of 
markets. 
 
Almost everyone agrees on two general features displayed by the recent banking 
crisis, namely: the crisis was stupefyingly complex and the financial system was 
devoured by its own creations. Beyond these points of agreement, there are many 
questions that will be debated by academics and policymakers for decades. One of the 
outstanding questions is what caused the financial crisis 2007-08.  
 
Causality is not a hot topic in economics. Apparently, the reason is that most 
economists see the notion of causality as neither necessary nor interesting. A case in 
point can be found in Samuelson’s Foundations: 
 
The only sense in which the use of the term causation is  
admissible is in respect to changes in external data or  
parameters. As a figure of speech, it may be said the  
changes in these cause changes in the variables of our  
system. An increase in demand, i.e., a shift in the demand  
function due to a change in the data, tastes, may be said to  
cause an increased output to be sold. Even here, when  
several parameters change simultaneously, it is impossible  
                                                 
1 In this paper the two terms ‘financial crisis 2007-08’ and ‘banking crisis 2007-08’ are used 
interchangeably because there is no room for confusion. 
2 For a recent model of financial crises incorporating Knightian uncertainty, see Caballero and Simsek 
(2009). 
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to speak of causation attributable to each except in respect  
to limiting rates of change (partial derivatives). 
  Samuelson (1965, pp. 9-10) [Italics in original]3 
 
Another (more recent) example is the view of James J. Heckman:4 
 
I argue that causality per se is not an interesting concept.  
What is interesting is the question of whether an empirically 
determined relationship can be used to provide valid forecasts  
of policy on an outcome. 
Heckman (2003, p. 73) 
 
Notwithstanding, economic analysis involving causality is not unusual. Sometimes 
economists speak about ‘informed conjectures’ to suggest that there are some 
‘proximate causes’ explaining a given empirical event E, say the financial crisis 2007-
08. See, for example, Diamond and Rajan (2009). At other times, economists allude to 
–but typically do not specify– the causes of the event they are explaining. For 
example, Brunnermeir (2009) concludes his illuminating paper about the liquidity and 
credit crunch 2007-08 asserting “This paper outlined several amplification 
mechanisms that help explain the causes of the financial turmoil.” However, the 
explicit identification of the causes of the banking crisis 2007-08 cannot be found in 
Brunnermeir (2009).   
 
Generally speaking, the tacit message conveyed by research on the causes of major 
economic events such as banking crises can be summarized as follows: at this initial 
stage, we are only developing models that help isolate the potential causes of the 
event E; further research will enable us to find the ultimate causes of E. The promise 
is always in the future. 
 
In essence, there are two different approaches to causality in economics. Speaking 
loosely, one can describe two groups of economists: those who believe that the 
economics profession should learn about causality through induction, and those who 
do not deny the importance of observation but believe that theoretical economics itself 
gives special insight into causality. In the first group we find the numerous followers 
of Clive W. J. Granger (1969). Granger causality is data-based without direct 
reference to economic theory developed to apply to dynamic time series models. The 
second group does not appear to contain many members and consists of those 
economists who follow John Hicks’ 1979 Causality in Economics.5 According to 
Hicks, any statement of causality has direct reference to a theory or model.  
 
There are two kinds of causality: strong causation (C is the sole cause of E) and weak 
causation (C is one of the causes of E). When there is more than one cause for E to 
have happened, interesting possibilities emerge. In fact, weak causation can be of two 
types: separable, meaning that C is a cause of E by itself, and non-separable, in which 
C is part of a separable cause but C is not a cause in isolation. Non-separability 
                                                 
3 Paul Anthony Samuelson won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1970. 
4 Heckman shared the 2000 economics Nobel Prize with Daniel L. McFadden. 
5 For a compact discussion of causality in economics and econometrics, see Hoover (2008). 
Surprisingly, Hoover (2008) does not cite Hicks’ Causality in Economics. This raises a puzzling 
question.  
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includes the possibility of a causal relation between causes. Moreover, the relation 
between causes can go one way or both ways. The latter possibility is termed ‘mutual 
causality’ by Hicks (1979, p. 19). 
 
To shed light on the question why the financial crisis 2007-08 happened, this paper 
compiles a list of the tentative causes of the recent financial crisis, discusses their 
separability and attempts an appraisal of the separable causes using the Hicksian 
methodology for causality analysis. Specifically, this paper identifies three major 
separable causes of the recent banking crisis and brings into sharp focus the far-from-
trivial requirements that are necessary in order to demonstrate that a particular set of 
events can indeed be the preponderant causes of the severe banking crisis 2007-08. 
 
One obvious question immediately suggests itself. Why is important to search for the 
causes of the financial crisis? The real chance of a meaningful global financial reform 
lies in the understanding of the causes of the recent financial meltdown. However, the 
issue of financial regulation is beyond the scope of the present paper.6 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 provide a very brief 
qualitative description of the critical factors underlying the financial meltdown.  
Section 4 compiles a list of tentative causes and discusses the arguments for particular 
separable causes. Section 5 establishes the conditions under which the identified 
potential causes can indeed be considered as the actual causes of the financial crisis 
2007-08. Section 6 offers a summary with a few concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Anatomy of the Financial Crisis 2007-08: Key Factors 
 
Speaking very loosely, a financial crisis is the observable effect E of the excesses 
which lead to a boom and an inevitable bust. Theoretical causality analysis starts with 
the search for tentative causes of E. To this end, it is necessary to sketch the economic 
logic for rationalizing the effect E. In the recent crisis, an excess of world saving 
combined with lax monetary policy and a number of financial innovations led to a 
housing and credit bubble, and eventually, to a catastrophic financial collapse. This 
compact description is a rough first approximation to an extraordinary complex set of 
phenomena suggesting that the financial crisis may not be attributable to a single 
cause.  
 
Quite obviously, it is necessary to implement a second approximation consisting of a 
characterization of the key factors (global saving glut, loose monetary policy and 
financial innovations) conducive to the double bubble. There are also additional 
factors inextricably linked to the financial crisis –such as excessive risk-taking and the 
existence of a ‘shadow’ banking system that developed without enough supervision– 
requiring at least a third approximation. 
 
2.1 Monetary Excesses and Financial Innovation 
 
Ben Bernanke warned in his influential ‘saving glut’ speech: “…the risk of a 
disorderly adjustment in financial markets always exists, and the appropriately 
conservative approach for policymakers is to be on guard for any such 
                                                 
6 For a concrete proposal of financial regulation focusing on innovation, see Pol (2009). 
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developments.” Bernanke (2005, p. 9). Excess world saving was due to asymmetries 
in financial development and growth prospects across different countries. In 
particular, the rapid growth of China and other East Asian economies led to large 
capital flows to the US and a decline in the US real interest rates. Caballero et al. 
(2008). 
 
Empirical evidence showing that interest rates were unusually low during 
2001-2008 can be found in Taylor (2008, p. 3). This author shows that there were 
monetary excesses during this period.7 In an environment of low real interest rates, 
US households were induced to take excessive housing risk, and thereby, the US 
residential housing market –together with the related markets for structured credit 
instruments– became the epicentre of the boom.  
 
There are four financial innovations that combined with each other to play a central 
role in the financial crisis 2007-08. First, the sub-prime mortgage innovation was 
designed to allow new buyers with lower credit scores and little documentation of 
income to purchase homes. Moreover, sub-prime mortgages were used not only for 
home purchase but also for cash-out refinancing.8 
 
The second financial innovation, namely securitization, is the defining characteristic 
of modern banking. Banks pool assets (from mortgages to student loans) and sell the 
packages of assets to other investors. The model of endogenous financial instability 
developed by Shleifer and Vishny (2009) combines three strands (micro-foundations 
of credit cyclicality, asset liquidity and behavioural corporate finance) by focussing 
on the mechanism of transmission of investor sentiment into commercial banking and 
the real economy. One of the theorems derived from their model is that “The principal 
source of instability is securitization.” Shleifer and Vishny (2009, p. 33).  
 
Third, the chief financial innovation used to provide AAA-rated bonds was re-
securitization which originated the Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). These 
complex financial products were the prototypal structured finance securities. The 
creation of a CDO involves two financial engineering operations: (a) ‘repackaging,’ 
consisting of putting together collections of securitized assets to originate a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV); and (b) ‘tranching,’ consisting of the extraction of sub-
collections of assets from an SPV, ordering them by degree of risk and specifying 
how the different tranches will absorb losses and pay interest. The process of 
repackaging and tranching originated some securities that were –only in appearance– 
safer than the average asset in the collateral pool and some that were riskier. In other 
words, the process concentrated default risk on one part of the capital structure and 
created securities that were considered almost riskless.  
 
Finally, there was a financial innovation that attracted particular attention from 
informed observers: the Credit Default Swap (CDS). The CDS innovation –due to 
                                                 
7 ‘Monetary excesses’ are defined as the difference between two interest rates, say  ra and rc,  where ra 
denotes the actual interest rate and rc is the interest rate that would have been if the Federal Reserve had 
followed the kind of policy that worked well during the great moderation era that began in the early 
1980s. 
8 ‘Cash-out refinancing’ means that the homeowner converts a fraction of the equity in the home into 
cash by cancelling the existing loan and taking out a new and larger loan. 
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Blythe Masters of J.P. Morgan– was introduced in 1995.9 The market for CDS was 
meant to insure against systemic risk, but instead brought the system to its knees. In 
fact, the eruption of the sub-prime crisis in July 2007 caused the value of the CDOs to 
plunge and this, in turn, caused buyers of CDSs on such securities to demand the 
corresponding payment. This (largely unregulated) market was blamed for the spread 
of speculative behaviour in widening circles. George Soros (2009) argued that 
speculative pressure within the CDS market makes the swaps to become delinked 
from their function of hedging against risk. 
 
2.2 Double Bubble 
 
Public policy decisions influenced the creation of new financial products. For 
example, the US government’s support for the development of secondary mortgage 
markets through government sponsored firms (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) 
encouraged the development of new products such as the sub-prime mortgage 
innovation. The expansion of the sub-prime mortgage market led to a deterioration in 
lending standards –as measured by a reduction in loan denial rates and a sizable 
increase in loan-to-income ratios. Furthermore, the rapid expansion of the refinancing 
business made it much easier for home owners to refinance their mortgages to take 
advantage of low interest rates and increasing home prices. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008). 
 
The housing bubble was accompanied by a massive credit expansion. Mortgages and 
other loans were to a very significant extent securitized and re-securitized tranching 
them into securities and selling them off. Financial institutions were able to make 
quick profits from changes in investor sentiment. Money market funds demand for 
AAA-rated bonds for reasons beyond the basic economics of payoffs was fuelled by 
monetary excesses.  
 
As the housing bubble collapsed, mortgages began to default. A significant 
amplification of the perceived uncertainty occurred when investors trashed the credit 
agencies rosy ratings. With benefit of hindsight, the substantial increase in the banks’ 
CDS spread in the period between the bailout of Bear Stearns and the fall of Lehman 
Brothers was a clear indicator of pervasive Knightian uncertainty. 
 
It should hardly be necessary to mention that the intricacies of the banking crisis 
2007-08 do not end here. There were a number of additional factors conducive to the 
sudden stop of the lending process at the end of 2008. These include: refinancing 
racket effect, ignorance, rating agencies, investment banks, snatcher culture, shadow 
banking system and poor supervision. 
 
3. Additional Factors 
 
                                                 
9 The CDSs are insurance contracts whose main function is to hedge against default. The buyer of the 
CDS makes payments to the seller in order to receive protection. The buyer receives a payment if a 
credit instrument (for example, a bond or a loan) goes into default or in the case of a specified credit 
event such as bankruptcy. These financial instruments are the derivatives that Warren Buffet termed 
‘financial weapons of mass destruction’ in his famous 2002 warning. 
 
 
6 
Over the past two decades, mortgage debt has grown more rapidly than home values 
due to the expansion of refinancing activities such as ‘cash-out refinancing’ where the 
homeowner receives cash after refinancing. Greenspan and Kennedy (2009). If the 
growth of these activities makes it easier for homeowners to refinance their mortgages 
to take advantage of low interest rates and increasing housing prices, the 
agglomeration of leverage during a market rise implies higher correlation defaults 
during a market drop. Thus, an expansion of the refinancing activity may engender 
systemic risk through the refinancing racket effect.10 
 
Anecdotal evidence points to the fact that the financial nomenclature became 
increasingly un-understandable not only for investors in general but also for some key 
top financial executives. For instance, acronyms such as SPVs, CDOs, CDSs, MBSs, 
and Alt-A, are difficult to understand or decipher at first glance.11 More importantly, 
investor understanding lagged behind the growing complexity of financial products 
such as CDOs. Under this optic the financial crisis could be traced to the existence of 
‘ignorance’ in the sense of difficulty of understanding the riskiness of complex 
financial products. 
 
Some observers blamed the rating agencies for being, in part, responsible for the 
financial crisis. Many CDOs were engineered to obtain high ratings with the ‘help’ of 
these agencies. Indeed, a substantial proportion of the structured finance securities 
was highly rated by rating agencies. For example, more than 50% of the CDOs rated 
by Moody’s carried a AAA rating –the highest possible rating. Benmelech and 
Dlugosz (2009, p. 1). 
 
Sophisticated institutional investors placed too much faith in the ratings agencies. 
This is understandable at least for two reasons. First, investors were unable to 
compute the risk underlying the CDOs. Second, they knew that numerous regulations 
used ratings as a criterion for permissible investments or as a component in required 
capital levels. Regrettably, the ratings models used by these agencies failed to 
properly account for default correlation across households or firms. Benmelech and 
Dlugosz (2009, p.6).  
                                                 
10 This effect was introduced and quantified by Khandani et al (2009, p. 2): “Once property values 
decline, a wave of defaults becomes unavoidable because mortgage lenders have no mechanism such as 
a margin call to compel homeowners to add more equity to maintain their leverage ratio, nor can 
homeowners reduce their leverage in incremental steps by selling a portion of their homes and using 
the proceeds to reduce their debt. This self-synchronizing “racket effect” of the refinancing market can 
create significant systemic risk in an otherwise geographically and temporarily diverse pool of 
mortgages, steadily increasing the aggregate leverage of the housing market until it reaches a 
systemically critical threshold.” 
11 This compelling point was forcibly made by Paul Kedrosky: 
 
There is an entire language required to understand this  
new generation of financial technologies, from credit  
default swaps to collateralized debt obligations to  
residential mortgage-backed securities, not to mention  
the corresponding three - and four-letter abbreviations.  
There’s also data on current account deficits and yield  
spreads. Most people, faced with this tsunami of data,  
do only the rational thing: they give up. 
Kedrosky (2008, p. 21) 
 
7 
Investment banks got themselves into so much trouble because they sold CDOs and 
also hold inventories of these assets on their own books. There are at least two 
plausible reasons for this dual role of banks. One is that the bankers believed that 
these securities were worthwhile investment. Coval et al. (2009, p. 22), Diamond and 
Rajan (2009, p. 4). The second reason –not necessarily inconsistent with the first one– 
is that the banks had to have a ‘skin in the game’ (holding a fraction of loans to 
outside investors) to signal the good credit quality of the securities. Shleifer and 
Vishny (2009, p. 9). 
 
Many years ago, John R. Hicks (1954) introduced the insight that firms may seek a 
balance between short-run and long-run profit maximization. Specifically, Hicks 
suggested that we should think of a decision maker as maximizing a convex 
combination of the rates of short-period profit g and long-period profit G, defined as 
ag + bG, where a and b are weights. He also suggested that the weights a and b may 
be governed by factors such as the willingness to bear risks and the rate of time 
preference, and introduced the compelling –but often forgotten– dichotomy 
Sticker/Snatcher. Hicks (1954, p. 45). In the context of financial markets, the 
Hicksian dichotomy can be paraphrased as follows. A financier confining attention to 
the maximization of long-term value (e.g. a venture capitalist) is called Sticker (high b 
relative to a). A financial executive who is interested in sizing a quick profit (e.g. a 
hedge fund manager) can be called Snatcher (high a relative to b).  
 
The culture of excessive risk-taking observed during the double bubble 2001-08 is 
consistent with the predominance of (perfect) Snatcher behaviour (a = one). In fact, 
there were at least three mutually reinforcing factors conducive to a high a relative to 
b: first, incentives to the top management; second, flawed internal compensation and 
control; and third, the impact of investor sentiment on the bank’s behaviour. 
 
The first two factors were singled out by Diamond and Rajan (2009). Top managers 
may not seek to maximize long-term bank value because they prefer to increase their 
stock prices and enhance their personal reputations. Even if top managers are perfect 
Stickers (b = one), it may be difficult to control traders working for the bank. The 
third factor prompting Snatcher behaviour (investor sentiment) has been stressed by 
Shleifer and Vishny (2009):   
 
investor sentiment, through securitization, infects banking  
and leads to cyclicality of profits, of investment, and at  
least of the market value of the balance sheet. Banks used  
up all their capitals in booms knowing full well that a crisis  
will come and that they will suffer (at least book) losses.  
But they realize that there is so much money to be made during  
booms that they should nonetheless extend themselves fully.  
Shleifer and Vishny (2009, p. 20) 
 
Furthermore, financial institutions operating outside the regulated banking system 
built up financial positions by borrowing short-term and lending long-term. The 
participants in this ‘shadow’ banking system became vulnerable to non-bank runs, 
that is, they could fail if markets lost confidence and refused to extend or roll over 
short-term credit as it happened with Bear Stearns. If investors expect that other 
8 
investors expect that CDOs issued by ‘shadow’ banks will be deprived of liquidity, 
‘equilibrium fragility’ may happen.12 
 
One of the distinguishing features of the financial crisis 2007-08 was regulation 
failure, not lack of regulation. The failure emerged from the inability of financial 
market regulations and supervisory systems in some developed countries to stop 
excessive risk taking and faulty management practices. For example, the failure of US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can be easily verified by looking at its 
home page (What do we Do?)13, where one can find the mission of the Office of Risk 
Assessment (ORA): 
 
The Office of Risk Assessment helps the SEC anticipate,  
identify, and manage risks, focusing on early identification  
of new or resurgent form of fraud and illegal or questionable  
activities. ORA focuses on risk issues across the corporate  
and financial sector, including issues relevant to corporate  
disclosure, market operation, sales practices, new product  
innovation, and other activities of financial markets participants.  
ORA analyses information from a variety of sources, such as  
external experts, domestic and foreign agencies, industry and  
financial services, empirical data and other market data. The  
Office develops and maintains the overall process for risk  
assessment throughout the SEC and serves as a resource for  
divisions and other offices in their risk assessment efforts,  
working closely with them as they work to identify, prioritize  
and mitigate risks. 
 
Wall Street’s worst year in decades culminated with another supervision failure: the 
Madoff affair. Christopher Cox, the SEC’s chairman, recognized that SEC overlooked 
Mr Madoff financial innovation consisting of a pyramid strategy in which existing 
investors’ returns were topped up with money from new investors. Both the SEC and 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority faced harsh criticism because these 
agencies were unable (or unwilling) to identify the largest Ponzi scheme in history. 
Bernard Madoff –the confessed swindler who developed the fraud– expressed to the 
SEC Inspector-general David Kotz in an interview early in 2009 that he was surprised 
that the SEC’s enforcement investigators did not discover the Ponzi scheme after he 
had told them plainly suspect information.14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Calvo (2009) develops a model of behaviour discontinuity under the assumption that the shadow 
system succeeds in ‘printing money’ through CDOs. 
13 Search done on Google, 11 December, 2008. 
14 See “SEC Blunders Amaze Madoff” by Zachary Goldfarb, The Washington Post, 1 November, 2009. 
 
 
9 
Finally, an additional risk-inviting factor, namely: the ‘too-big-to-fail’ phenomenon, 
should not be overlooked. The importance of this phenomenon has been carefully 
examined by Stern and Feldman (2006). The notion of ‘too-big-to-fail’ revolves 
around the credibility of policymakers’ commitment to not bailout large financial 
institutions. The empirical evidence strongly points to the fact that when, for example, 
a large bank is about to fail, policymakers will renege on their pledge because they 
want to avoid the systemic risk that the failure of the bank would entail.15 
 
4. Sifting and Sorting Potential Causes 
 
From now on, the event E representing the effect in the causal relationship ‘C caused 
E’ will be identified with the sudden stop of the lending process at the end of October 
2008. The preceding sketch of the financial logic underlying the banking crisis 2007-
08 enables us to compile the list of tentative causes of E shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Although these elements were not entering the financial system simultaneously, it is 
clear that they were operating jointly during the same period of time T (somewhat 
roughly, 2001-2008), and thereby, the elements included in the list can be considered 
as contemporaneous events. All ten items have merit. None is unassailable. 
 
On the last (I10), it is not inconceivable that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ phenomenon may 
have encouraged large and complex financial institutions to take on too much risk and 
adopt Snatcher behaviour. However, few analysts would argue that the expectation 
that tax payers would end up footing the bill of bank loss was one of the preponderant 
causes of the financial debacle at the end of 2008. 
 
On the second last, there is no doubt that poor supervision contributed to worsening 
the opacity of the financial system but it would be hard to argue that this factor 
provoked the financial catastrophe. Supervision cannot restore transparency if the 
existing financial regulation is obsolete. For example, the ‘shadow’ banking system 
was beyond the control of the SEC. On the third last (I8), there is evidence that loose 
monetary policy and excessive risk-taking are connected. Taylor (2009, p. 10). This 
suggests that I8 (Snatcher culture) was induced by I2 (Loose monetary policy), and 
therefore, I8 cannot be considered as a separable cause of E. 
  
It is generally agreed that re-securitization was a key factor in the generation of 
ignorance. As complex products multiplied from CDOs to CDOs of CDOs (or 
CDOs2) it became harder and harder for investors to understand what the quality of 
the underlying assets had to do with their value. Here (again) there is a causal relation 
between tentative causes: I5 engenders I7 (the relation between causes goes at least 
one way). It could also be argued that the relationship between re-securitization and 
                                                 
15 Apparently, the term ‘too-big-to-fail’ was first introduced by Congressman McKinney in 1984. The 
‘too-big-to-fail’ problem is due to a lack of credibility and this lack of credibility is just another 
manifestation of the time-inconsistency problem discussed some thirty years ago by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978). Nowadays, the term ‘too-big-to-fail’ is applied to a policy in which 
the government provides guarantees of repayment of large uninsured creditors of the largest financial 
institutions. 
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ignorance went both ways, and therefore, there was mutual causality between I5 and 
I7. In any case, it should be clear that the tentative cause I7 is an integral part of I5. 
 
Consequently, we are left with six candidates: I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, and I6. Quite obviously, 
the first two items (global saving glut and monetary policy) are related to each other. 
In essence, there are two possibilities to be taken into account: either the money 
supply was, at least in part, endogenous or the money supply was incorrectly 
controlled by the monetary authority.   
 
The first possibility means that global asset scarcity led to large capital flows toward 
the US and the monetary authority could not control the money supply growth rate 
(this is not to deny that the Federal Reserve could control the high-powered money 
stock with considerable accuracy). The second possibility is consistent with central 
banks’ excesses and mistakes induced by abundant liquidity and a decline in US and 
world interest rates (item I2). Moreover, this possibility is in line with Taylor’s view, 
namely: the root cause of the financial crisis was loose monetary policy. Taylor 
(2009). Reality is probably in between I1 and I2. It is for this reason that I1 and I2 can 
be considered as non-separable causes and merged into a separable cause C0 identified 
here as ‘extremely accommodative monetary policy by the world central banks 
conducive to low interest rates.’ In brief, C0 means ‘monetary excesses.’ 
 
The United States was not by any means the only country with low interest rates 
during the period of time T. Then, why the collapse first manifested itself in the US? 
Few economists would deny that an acceptable answer is: “Probably because the US 
went further on financial innovation, thus drawing more marginal-credit-quality 
buyers into the [housing] market!” Diamond and Rajan (2009, p. 3). The four 
financial innovations underlying items I3, I4, I5.and I6 operated concurrently over the 
period T and reinforced each other engendering a double (housing and credit) bubble.  
 
One typical question about the financial turbulence that engulfed the world starting in 
July 2007 is how securities backed by sub-prime mortgages could infect the global 
banking system. Underlying this question is the presumption that the sub-prime 
mortgage is viewed, at least in part, as a potential cause of the financial collapse at the 
end of 2008. In fact, it is generally agreed that the origins of the financial crisis 2007-
08 can be traced to the sub-prime mortgage innovation and the invention of similar 
mortgage products such as Alt-A mortgages. See, for example, Dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2008) and Mayer at al. (2009). 
 
The root problem with securitization and re-securitization was the lack of incentives 
to monitor the quality of the underlying loans. I5 (Re-securitization) presupposes I4 
(Securitization), so that for logical reasons I5 cannot exist without I4. In other words, 
I4 is an integral part of I5, and therefore, I4 is a non-separable cause of E. 
 
As to I6 (Credit Default Swaps), the availability of default insurance contracts induced 
many investors to believe that the uncertainty surrounding the CDOs could be 
ameliorated. For example, if the AAA-rated tranches of a CDO defaulted, the CDS 
would cover the corresponding loss. This reasoning crucially depends on the 
assumption that the probability of the CDS counterparty default was negligible.  
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The CDSs engendered a mirage. Worldly wisdom captured the relevance of these 
insurance contracts as follows: buying CDSs was like buying insurance for the Titanic 
from someone on the Titanic. It is evident that the CDSs delayed the occurrence of the 
financial collapse and constituted an important magnifying factor of wealth 
destruction but they cannot be held responsible for the financial collapse at the end of 
2008. The biggest problem was the fragility of the securities with bad loans in them, 
not the CDSs. 
 
The foregoing suggests the following three separable potential causes of the event E:  
 
C0: Monetary excesses; 
C1: Sub-prime mortgage; and  
C2: Re-securitization. 
 
This triad of causes appears to be at the core of the extraordinarily complex dynamic 
process conducive to the financial meltdown 2007-08. In rough outline, periods of 
financial bonanza are driven by monetary excesses and financial innovation. New 
liquidity-enhancing products (CDOs) based on toxic assets (sub-prime mortgages) 
engender bubbles and growing uncertainty, especially Knightian uncertainty. As asset 
prices plummet, fire sales elevate uncertainty enough to impair the efficiency of the 
financial system. Complexity increases for financial institutions in the sense that they 
need to understand more and more the financial network to avoid an indirect shock 
from counterparty risk. The rise in complexity increases the perceived uncertainty of 
these institutions.16 When confronted with pervasive uncertainty in the strict sense, 
economic reasoning is of no value and people suddenly attempt to disengage from 
distant commitments in favour of liquidity. Ultimately, an intolerable degree of 
uncertainty suddenly paralyses the lending process. 
 
5. Testing for Causality: Not an Easy Task  
 
The use of language with respect to causality can be very confusing. There is no 
single definition of causality as illustrated by the discussion in the books by Pearl 
(2000) and Hoover (2001). According to the Macquarie dictionary, ‘cause’ is ‘that 
which produces an effect.’ This automatically implies that when we state ‘C caused 
E,’ we mean that E followed from C, that is, C was a sufficient condition for E to 
happen; briefly, if C then E. I call this lay-person approach to causation the intuitive 
interpretation of causality. For example, the statement ‘monetary excesses caused the 
financial crisis 2007-08’ means that the presence of abnormally low interest rates was 
a sufficient condition for the financial crisis to happen. 
 
Causality (the relation between cause C and effect E) in social sciences has always 
been an awkward topic. It would be quite fair to say that the notion of causality in 
economics was slippery and ambiguous until John R. Hicks wrote a methodological 
tour the force Causality in Economics. Causality is “not only the study of what 
happened, but why it happened.” Hicks (1979, p. 5).  
 
                                                 
16 Caballero and Simsek (2009) have formalized the role of endogenous complexity observed in severe 
financial crises. 
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Hicks’s definition of causality (henceforth, ‘basic definition of causality’) is as 
follows:17  
 
For causality, we must be maintaining that if C had not  
existed, E would not have existed; if not-C, then not-E.  
But not-C and not-E are not events which have happened.  
(in recent discussions among historians they are described  
as ‘counterfactual’). 
Hicks (1979, p. 8) 
 
The basic definition refers to an empirical association between economic facts. It is 
clear that the statement ‘C caused E’ presupposes that both C and E existed. What 
may not be as obvious is that the Hicksian definition of causality constitutes a 
significant departure from the intuitive interpretation of causality. For in strictness, 
the basic definition transforms the statement ‘C caused E’ into ‘C was a necessary 
condition for E to happen.’ Or, to put it differently, C must be present if E is to occur, 
but by itself is not enough to guarantee that E will occur. 
 
According to Hicks, all causality analysis depends on theory. In particular, a causality 
test should be based on a theory or model. The test for the basic definition requires the 
construction of a hypothetical situation (termed Not-C construction) in which C did 
not exist, ceteris paribus.18 It is said that C passes the test if with Not-C, the effect E 
would not have happened. Hicks (1979, p. 14). For example, the test of the statement 
‘monetary contraction was the cause of the Great Depression’ requires the 
construction of a theory showing that the absence of monetary contraction implies that 
the Great Depression would not have happened. In general, the formulation of the 
Not-C construction is unconstrained in that the selection of the assumptions for the 
Not-C theory is a matter left in the hands of the economic theoreticians.  
In broad outline, the Hicksian methodology for causality analysis consists of three 
steps. First, the analyst has to identify the effect E (an empirical event) and detect one 
or more potential causes of E by empirical observation. Second, it is necessary to 
develop theories where the potential causes are not present (the theory is to show what 
would have happened if some cause had been absent). Finally, for each Not-C 
construction a causality test must be performed. The causality test consists of 
checking whether or not the theory in question is compatible with the existence of the 
observed effect E. 
 
Unfortunately, the Hicksian methodology for causality analysis involves an 
unavoidable mental gymnastics. If there are only two potential causes, say C0 and C1, 
the economist should test three possibilities: 
 
Not-C0: C0 was absent while C1 was present; 
Not-C1: C1 was absent while C0 was present; and 
Not-C01: C0 and C1 were absent, ceteris paribus. 
 
                                                 
17 The notation used by Hicks is ‘A causes B,’ where A and B denote the cause and the effect, 
respectively. 
18 More precisely, the Not-C construction is not defined as capturing all events other than C occurring 
over a period of time T, but only all other potential separable causes of E. 
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When the number of potential causes increases, the analysis becomes increasingly 
complicated. For example, if there are three candidate causes, say C0, C1 and C2, it is 
necessary to test seven possibilities: 
 
Not-C0: C0 was absent while C1 and C2 were present; 
Not-C1: C1 was absent while C0 and C2 were present; 
Not-C2: C2 was absent while C0 and C1 were present; 
Not-C01: C0 and C1 were absent while C2 was present; 
Not-C02: C0 and C2 were absent while C1 was present;  
Not-C12: C1 and C2 were absent while C0 was present;  
Not-C012: C0, C1 and C2 were absent, ceteris paribus. 
 
As in section 4, the effect E in the statement ‘C caused E’ is identified with the 
sudden stop of the lending process at the end of October 2008. The statements ‘E 
occurs’ and ‘E does not happen’ will be denoted by ⊕  and , respectively. With this 
notation, statements such as: 
 
‘Not-C0 and E occurs’ and ‘Not-C0 and E does not happen’ 
 
will be abbreviated by  
 
Not-C0 and ⊕ and Not-C0 and ,  
 
respectively. A similar notation will be used for the other possibilities. For example, 
‘Not-C01 and E occurs’ is denoted by ‘Not-C01 and ⊕,’ and the symbolism ‘Not-C012 
and ’ means ‘when C0, C1 and C2 are absent, E does not happen.’19 
 
There are several cases that can occur. Table 2 shows only four of them. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Cases 1 and 4 are polar cases. Case 1 is obvious: neither is a cause. In Case 4, C0 
passes the test, but neither C1 nor C2 pass the test, so C0 is the sole cause. In other 
words, C1 and C2 are irrelevant.20 Case 2 is the case of overlapping causes: the effect 
E occurs if either is present separately or in pairs, but the effect does not occur when 
C0, C1 and C2 are simultaneously absent. Finally, Case 3 says that C0, C1 and C2 pass 
the causality tests separately, in pairs and together. Each candidate is a separable 
cause and the crisis will not happen when the three causes are absent. They are 
additive causes. 
 
How many of these cases can be eliminated as inadmissible on the basis of empirical 
data? None. The tests for causality are theoretical, not empirical. Research appears to 
suggest the financial crisis 2007-08 fits Case 3 (additive causes). However, the proof 
that additive causes were present in the financial crisis requires testing seven (non-
obvious) possibilities.  
 
                                                 
19 The notation is a bit cumbersome but facilitates the discussion. I could not find an efficient way of 
reducing notational clutter. 
20 Few analysts would maintain that the financial crisis 2007-08 can be explained with just one cause. 
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Adequate or even plausible Not-C constructions do not presently exist. Failure to 
construct these hypothetical situations implies that the identification of the causes of 
the financial crisis 2007-08 remains incomplete. It is probably right to conclude from 
the foregoing discussion that the proof of the existence of causality in the recent 
financial crisis using the Hicksian methodology is surpassingly stringent.  
 
That Hicks’s masterly Causality in Economics is a fruitful and suggestive line of 
approach to causality cannot be doubted. But it is too much to suppose that very many 
economists have the patient, time, and above all, the creativity necessary to construct 
the hypothetical situations necessary to test for causality. This may well be one of the 
reasons why Causality in Economics has been virtually ignored in the economics 
profession. Ordinarily, the economist is not in possession of the required theories and 
resorts to reliable inference (revolving around intuition, good judgement and good 
models) to justify informed conjectures about proximate causes.  
 
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
Although much has already been written about the recent financial crisis, causality 
issues do not seem well covered by existing models but rather by only informed 
conjectures. The complexity and multiplicity of forces conducive to the banking crisis 
2007-08 make a general theory of this event intractable. Furthermore, the technical 
details displayed by this crisis were so numerous that they tend to obscure potential 
separable causes.  
 
In this paper the financial crisis has been identified with the event E, defined as a 
sudden stop of the lending process at the end of October 2008. The narrative suggests 
that three facts (namely: C0: Monetary excesses, C1: Sub-prime mortgage, and C2: Re-
securitization) are the preponderant causes of E. According to the Hicksian 
perspective, to show that the statement ‘C0, C1, and C2 caused E,’ it is necessary to 
develop seven theories satisfying Case 3 in Table 2. 
 
Scholars in economics are not born to live an easy life. Their existence becomes 
particularly difficult when they have to find the causes of a massive financial crisis. 
Many years ago, Paul A. Samuelson made a methodological point that it is still true 
today, and perhaps will be true forever: 
 
Now in a hard, exact science a practitioner does not have  
to know much about methodology. Indeed, even if he is a 
definitely misguided methodologist, the subject itself has  
a self-cleansing property which renders harmless his  
aberrations. By contrast, a scholar in economics who is 
fundamentally confused concerning the relationship of 
definition, tautology, logical implication, empirical  
hypothesis, and factual refutation may spend a life-time  
shadow-boxing with reality. In a sense, therefore, in order to  
earn his daily bread as a fruitful contributor to knowledge,  
the practitioner of an intermediately hard science like  
economics must come to terms with methodological problems. 
Samuelson (1965, p. ix) 
 
15 
Causality is not only a deep methodological problem but also a most complex 
philosophical issue. The task of defining and analysing causality from a theoretical 
angle was undertaken by John R. Hicks in Causality in Economics. According to 
Hicks, causality should be understood as an empirical relation between fact C (cause) 
and fact E (effect), and theoretical economics should be the ultimate judge in relation 
to the existence of causality. 
 
It should be emphasized that even if the analyst is able to construct a model in which 
the logical inference ‘C0, C1 and C2  E‘ is factually true, this does not prove of itself 
that C0, C1 and C2 are the causes of E. According to the Hicksian perspective, to show 
that C0, C1 and C2  are the separable causes of E the economist must develop all the 
theories involved in Table 2 and confirm that ‘E does not happen’ holds for all seven 
possibilities (Case 3, Table 2). 
 
The Hicksian method’s great strength is that it requires the elaboration of economic 
theories to establish causal relations. There are weaknesses, however, inherent to 
Hicks’ approach. The method is arduous requiring the construction of a significant 
number of theories when there are three or more potential causes to be tested. The art 
of theoretical economics thinking includes deciding which assumptions to make and 
this implies that there could be theoretical constructions based on unacceptable 
assumptions for some economists.  
 
For example, suppose that an economist is able to develop all the theories necessary 
to test C0, C1 and C2 , that his theories confirm Case 3 in Table 1 with logical 
compulsion, and that all of his theories assume rational expectations and perfect 
capital markets in a fundamental way. Would other economists be willing to accept 
those theories as a proof of causality in the context of the financial crisis 2007-08? 
 
Perhaps the main reason why Causality in Economics has been virtually ignored by 
the economics profession could be found in the following –disturbing– paragraph: 
 
The degree of certainty which we attribute to some of the 
generalizations (and predictions) of the natural sciences is  
such that it is hard to distinguish it from logical necessity;  
we are as certain as that the sun will rise tomorrow as we  
are that two and two make four. No one can attach that  
degree of certainty to any economic prediction. Even the  
lesser degree which attached to predictions in meteorology  
or medicine is in economics far to seek. Economics is a  
leading example of uncertain knowledge; it is knowledge,  
yet it is evidently uncertain. Now if we are able, at least in  
some relevant aspects, to understand the significance of  
uncertain knowledge, we can proceed from that to  
incorporate the case of near-certain knowledge, merely by  
diminishing the degree of uncertainty. If, however, we take  
the case of near-certain knowledge as our typical case  
(especially if we allow ourselves to neglect the –perhaps  
very small– degree of uncertainty which accompanies it)  
we are bound to find it much harder to proceed to uncertain 
knowledge, which then appears as radically different. 
16 
Hicks (1979, p. 2) 
 
That is probably la condition scientifique of economics: its inability in all too many 
cases to reach definitive conclusions about causality questions. 
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I1:   Global saving glut; 
I2:   Loose monetary policy; 
I3:   Sub-prime mortgage; 
I4:   Securitization; 
I5:   Re-securitization; 
I6:   Credit Default Swaps; 
I7:  Ignorance  
I8:   Snatcher culture; and  
I9:   Poor supervision 
I10:   Too-big-to-fail 
 
 
Table 1 (Tentative causes) 
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    Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  
 
Not-C0  ⊕  ⊕      
 
Not- C1 ⊕  ⊕    ⊕  
 
Not-C2  ⊕  ⊕    ⊕ 
  
Not-C01 ⊕  ⊕     
   
Not-C02 ⊕  ⊕     
  
Not-C12 ⊕  ⊕    ⊕  
 
Not-C012 ⊕       
  
 
Table 2 (Three potential causes and four illustrative cases) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
